CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1634
22 January 2001

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH
FRENCH and
RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 22 JANUARY 2001 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE ENGLISH, FRENCH AND RUSSIAN TEXTS OF THE JOINT STATEMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON COOPERATION IN THE SPHERE OF STRATEGIC STABILITY

We have the honour to forward to you the English, French and Russian texts of the Joint Statement of the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the Russian Federation on cooperation in the sphere of strategic stability.

We would be grateful if this Joint Statement could be issued and circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Vasily SIDOROV
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of
the Russian Federation to the
Conference on Disarmament

(Signed:) Christopher WESTDAL
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of
Canada to the Conference on
Disarmament

JOINT STATEMENT
of the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the Russian Federation on cooperation in the sphere of strategic stability

The Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the Russian Federation confirm their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security as one of today's most important priorities.

In this regard, Canada takes note of the Statement of the President of the Russian Federation on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and strategic stability of November 13, 2000. Canada and the Russian Federation agree that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability and an important foundation for international efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The two countries hope for the earliest entry into force and full implementation of the START II Treaty. They also hope for conclusion of a START III Treaty as soon as possible, including far-reaching reductions in strategic offensive weapons while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty.

The Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the Russian Federation are committed to exploring concrete new bilateral and multilateral approaches to limiting the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies. In this context, Canada and the Russian Federation will continue together with other countries to work on proposals for confidence-building measures and normative instruments developed by the member-states of the Missile Technology Control Regime as well as the Russian proposal for a global control system over non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies.

In the interests of strengthening global strategic stability and the non-proliferation regime, Canada and the Russian Federation will continue close cooperation on preventing an arms race in outer space, including interaction in the preparation and holding in Moscow in the spring of 2001 of an international conference on the non-weaponization of outer-space, as well as efforts at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to re-establish an appropriate Ad Hoc Committee. A round table of experts of the two countries will be held in January 2001 in order to compare the views of both sides in this sphere.

Canada and the Russian Federation welcome the successful outcome of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference earlier this year, confirm their full support for its Final Document and pledge maximum efforts to carry out its commitments for concrete action at an early date. In this regard, they will work resolutely for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and will strengthen their efforts to re-initiate negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

Canada and the Russian Federation are also ready to widen discussions, particularly within the framework of the IAEA, on the issues associated with the initiative of the Russian President on the energy requirements of sustainable development, global ecological revitalization and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Canada and the Russian Federation reaffirm their shared commitment to the non-proliferation and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and reaffirm their full support for export control arrangements aimed at achieving these goals. They agree on the need to move quickly towards the implementation of the Russian Federation/USA Agreement on Plutonium Dispositioning. In this regard they stress the importance of ongoing work to achieve the goal set by the G8 to develop, by the time of the Genoa Summit of the G8, an international financing plan for plutonium management and disposition based on a detailed project plan and a multilateral framework to coordinate this cooperation. Canada and the Russian Federation reaffirm the commitment made at the 1996 Moscow Summit to safety first in the use of nuclear power and achievement of high safety standards world wide, as well as their commitment to the Nuclear Safety Convention.

Canada and the Russian Federation are both committed to the Chemical Weapons Convention and to cooperating in its implementation.

Canada and the Russian Federation confirm that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed ten years ago, is still the cornerstone of stability in Europe and note the importance of the Second Review Conference to be held in May 2001. The two countries affirm the importance of the entry into force of the Open Skies Treaty.

Canada and the Russian Federation state their resolve to enhance the effectiveness of the UN and its Security Council, the UN's key body, in maintaining international peace and security. They also consider it important to search collectively for ways to increase the effectiveness of the international community's capacity to react to critical crisis situations, including of humanitarian character, in accordance with the UN Charter, decisions of the Security Council and norms and principles of international law. In this regard, they in particular will work to implement the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel report on UN Peace Operations agreed by the Security Council as detailed in Security Council Resolution 1327 and the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

Canada and the Russian Federation agree on the importance of enriching the on-going NATO Russia dialogue and the work of the Permanent Joint Council as laid down in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. They discussed ways to enhance the NATO-Russia partnership and noted the successful cooperation of NATO and Russian forces in the Balkans. Canada and the Russian Federation agreed that cooperation in the framework of the PJC can make an important contribution to security and stability.

Canada and the Russian Federation attach special importance to the OSCE as a comprehensive regional organization for consultations, decision-making and cooperation. They welcome its key contribution to the development of an area of equal security on the basis of the concept of common and comprehensive security. They reaffirm their adherence to the principles, norms and commitments enshrined in OSCE documents. Canada and the Russian Federation agreed that the full realization of the OSCE's potential in the political-military, economic, environmental and humanitarian dimensions of security, without regional selectivity, would allow it to react effectively to the challenges to international security, including international terrorism, militant extremism, organized crime and drug

trafficking, as well as to protect and facilitate the exercise of the rights of national minorities, thereby preventing inter-ethnic conflicts. They will work together to solve these problems.

Canada and the Russian Federation express their concern about the problem of illicit trafficking, uncontrolled and destabilizing spread and excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons in the world, especially in conflict regions. They declare their full support for the UN Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects planned for July 2001 and call for that conference to adopt a comprehensive action plan of concrete measures to combat this problem.

Canada and the Russian Federation attach great importance to the development of Canada-Russia interaction within the framework of international operations under the aegis of the UN aimed at strengthening regional security and stability and human security. The Russian Federation confirms its positive approach towards the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and of their Destruction, and its intent to join it in due course. Canada restates its desire to collaborate with the Russian Federation in joint endeavours on humanitarian de-mining and liquidation of stockpiles of anti-personnel mines.

Canada and the Russian Federation discussed the human rights and human security agenda in a broad and comprehensive approach. They noted in particular the importance of dealing with issues such as small arms and light weapons, war affected children and the protection of civilians in armed conflict. In this regard, Canada welcomed the Russian Federation's recent signature of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

As agreed at the G8, both Canada and the Russian Federation are determined to fight the main causes of the multiple threats to human security, and are committed to creating an environment where the basic rights, the safety and the very survival of all individuals are guaranteed. They condemn all forms of terrorism regardless of their motivation. They welcome the successful negotiation of the UN Convention Against Organized Crime and look forward to its early entry into force. Canada and the Russian Federation emphasize that crucial cornerstones of human security remain democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance and human development.

Canada and the Russian Federation look forward to working closely on a wide agenda for conflict prevention, and in this context, express concern over the link between the illicit trade in rough diamonds and armed conflict. Canada and the Russian Federation underline the need for action in support of UN and G8 commitments and other international initiatives to address this problem, including further consideration of a simple and workable international certification scheme for rough diamonds.

The Russian Federation notes the establishment by Canada of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Canada and the Russian Federation agree to consult regularly during the course of the Commission's work.

Canada and the Russian Federation will continue to consult and cooperate in their

efforts to contribute to the peace process with a view to reaching a just and comprehensive Middle East settlement.

Canada and the Russian Federation support the efforts of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to promote democracy, security and prosperity in that region. The inclusion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in October completes the Pact's regional membership and will greatly assist the Pact in achieving its goals, including stronger regional ownership of the process. In addition, Canada and the Russian Federation will continue to work together in the High Level Steering Group to catalyse assistance to the region, and coordinate donor involvement in the most efficient manner.

Canada and the Russian Federation intend to continue the practice of coordinating the approaches of the two countries in the sphere of strategic stability at annual official consultations.

Ottawa, December 18, 2000

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1635
23 January 2001

Original: ENGLISH

Agenda for the 2001 session

(Adopted at the 862nd plenary meeting, on 23 January 2001)

Taking into account, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and deciding to resume its consultations on the review of its agenda, and without prejudice to their outcome, the Conference adopts the following agenda for its 2001 session:

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

7. Transparency in armaments.

8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

ONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1636
24 January 2001

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 JANUARY 2001 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF MONGOLIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MONGOLIA ISSUED ON 6 OCTOBER 2000 IN CONNECTION WITH SECURITY ASSURANCES PROVIDED TO MONGOLIA BY THE FIVE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES

I have the honour to transmit to you the Statement of the Government of Mongolia issued on 6 October 2000 in connection with security assurances provided to Mongolia by the five nuclear-weapon States.

I would be grateful if this Statement is circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Batzorig SUVD
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

01-60188

S T A T E M E N T

of the Government of Mongolia in connection with
security assurances provided to Mongolia by
the five nuclear-weapon States

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1637
31 January 2001

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 JANUARY 2001 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A MEDIA STATEMENT ISSUED ON 17 JANUARY 2001 BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE ON THE DESTRUCTION OF SURPLUS AND CONFISCATED FIREARMS

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a media statement issued on 17 January 2001 by the South African Police Service on the destruction of surplus and confiscated firearms.

This destruction of surplus and confiscated firearms by the South African Police Service is a follow-up initiative to the destruction of redundant and obsolete small arms by the South African National Defence Force. Information on the latter destruction was distributed as document CD/1621 dated 6 July 2000.

I would be grateful if this statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all Member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed): Thomas Markram
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
Deputy Head of the
South African Delegation
to the Conference on Disarmament

MEDIA STATEMENT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE (SAPS) DIVISIONAL COMMISSIONER OF LOGISTICS: DIVISIONAL COMMISSIONER HAMILTON HLELA

BENONI, SOUTH AFRICA : 17 JANUARY 2001

STATEMENT REGARDING THE DESTRUCTION OF FIREARMS

Another significant step to rid South Africa from the scourge of firearms related violence was taken today with the destruction of 102 tons of firearms, parts of firearms and firearm spares, with an estimated value of nearly R26,5 million (US$ 3,5 million).

A total of 27 816 firearms, including pistols, revolvers, rifles, shotguns and home-made firearms were destroyed. The firearms, which were destroyed in this batch, include 4 524 confiscated and home-made firearms as well as 23 292 redundant police firearms. Seven (7) launchers and 20 336 parts of firearms and spares were also destroyed.

The destruction of confiscated firearms is the last step to be taken after completion of police investigation. No confiscated firearm will be destroyed by the SAPS unless the investigation (including forensic testing) has been completed.

Many South Africans die annually through the criminal or negligent use of firearms. This causes emotional and financial hardship in many South African homes as well as businesses and must be stopped at all cost.

It is a priority of the South African Police Service to stop the proliferation of firearms into the hands of criminals and to promote responsible firearm ownership with legal firearm owners. I believe that the Firearms Control Act, that will be implemented soon, will further assist the SAPS to reduce firearm-related violence significantly over the next few years. With the correct legislation as support and the commitment of each member of the SAPS and the community, we will make a profound impact on violent crime in the country.

We are also committed to stopping the flow of illegal firearms across our borders and many successes have been reported. During the past number of years thousands of firearms and ammunition have been destroyed in Mozambique in the different Operations Rachel. More than 12 100 firearms and nearly 104 000 rounds of ammunition have been confiscated since March 2000 in Operation Crackdown. This includes 6 229 handguns and 4 578 hunting rifles. In most cases, the serial numbers were removed, which make it difficult or impossible to trace the original owner.

A number of state departments have completed audits of the number of licensed firearms in their possession. A large number of redundant state-owned firearms have already been handed over to the SAPS for destruction as part of government s commitment to reduce the proliferation of firearms.

By destroying confiscated firearms and redundant state-owned firearms, we ensure that these firearms will not find their way into the hands of criminals.

I appeal again to all South Africans to work closely with the SAPS to eradicate illegal firearms in the country. We all must be prepared to take a giant leap towards a future where firearm violence does not pose a threat to the South African society.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1638
2 February 2001

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 JANUARY 2001 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE ON 11 JANUARY 2001 BY THE BULGARIAN DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE AT A MEETING WITH MILITARY AND DEFENCE ATTACHES

I have the honour to transmit enclosed herewith the text of a statement made on January 11, 2001 by the Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Defence at a meeting with Military and Defence Attaches.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all Member States and observer States of the CD.

(Signed) Petko Draganov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Bulgaria
to the Conference on Disarmament

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ENG

STATEMENT

By Deputy Minister of Defence at a meeting with Military and Defence Attachés
Sofia, 11 January 2001

In accordance with its consistent policy of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, Republic of Bulgaria ratified on July 29, 1998 the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their destruction (Ottawa Convention). On September 16, 1999 a National Program for the implementation of the Convention was adopted by the Bulgarian Government. It comprises all details concerning the destruction of the stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, the demining of the minefields and the financing of these activities. An Inter-agency working group under the chairmanship of a Deputy Minister of Defence was established to control the implementation of the Program.

The National Program was successfully implemented. Let me mention the most significant achievements in this respect:

- by October 30, 1999 all minefields on the territory of Bulgaria have been cleared and antipersonnel mines have been destroyed. During the period 1997-1999, 68 antipersonnel minefields were cleared and 13 926 antipersonnel mines, type PSM-1 have been destroyed on the spot. A total of 13 364 acres were set mine-free.

- by the end of 1999 the Ministry of Defence handed-over all its stockpiled antipersonnel mines to DUNARIT Company and TEREM Company. It is my pleasure to announce today that by December 20, 2000 a total of 881 970 antipersonnel mines were destroyed by these companies and Bulgaria became a 100% antipersonnel mine-free country.

Bulgaria has assumed a firm commitment both at national and international levels to combat the landmines threat and is ready to provide full support and assistance to all relevant efforts aiming at the complete and universal abolition of antipersonnel mines. In this context Bulgaria reiterates its readiness to provide experts to participate in the global destruction of antipersonnel mines. The specialized enterprises, which have the capacity and an original technology, are ready to participate in such operations.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1639
7 February 2001

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 FEBRUARY 2001 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GEORGIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT MADE BY THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND GEORGIA ON THE AGREEMENT SIGNED ON 29 JANUARY 2001 IN ANKARA CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BILATERAL REGIME FOR KEEPING THEIR COMMON BORDER FREE FROM ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND PREVENTING THEIR USE FOR BORDER PROTECTION PURPOSES IN THE FUTURE

We have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the joint statement made by the Republic of Turkey and Georgia on the agreement signed on 29 January 2001 in Ankara, concerning the establishment of a bilateral regime for keeping their common border free from anti-personnel mines and preventing their use for border protection purposes in the future.

We would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed) Murat SUNGAR
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Turkey

(Signed) Amiran KAVADZE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Georgia

JOINT STATEMENT BY REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND GEORGIA
Ankara, 29 January 2001

On the occasion of the visit of H.E. Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Georgia, to Turkey, at he invitation of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Necdet Sezer, President of the Republic of Turkey, an agreement between the Republic of Turkey and Georgia, on establishing a bilateral regime for keeping their common border free from anti-personnel mines and preventing their use for border guard purposes in the future, is signed in Ankara on 29 January 2001 by H.E. Mr. Ismail Cem, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey and H.E. Mr. Irakli Menagarishvili, the Foreign Minister of Georgia.

According to this Agreement, the two countries undertake to clear the designated area starting from their common border from anti-personnel mines and to prevent their use for border guard purposes in the future as well. The agreement also envisages a verification regime.

Aware of the human sufferings and casualties caused by the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines, the two countries, by signing this Agreement, have proved their determination to contribute to the ongoing efforts of the international community aimed at the total elimination of this inhuman weapon.

This Agreement constitutes the latest expression of the achieved quality of the relations between the two neighbouring countries and underlines their common will to further strengthen the existing exemplary relations between them and to contribute to stability, security and transparency in the region.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1640
15 February 2001

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH and
RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 12 FEBRUARY 2001 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH TEXTS OF A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON NOTIFICATIONS OF MISSILE LAUNCHES SIGNED IN BRUSSELS ON 16 DECEMBER 2000 BY U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IGOR IVANOV

Attached are the Russian and English language textes of a Memorandum of Understanding on Notifications of Missile Launches signed in Brussels on December 16, 2000, by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.

We would be grateful if you would issue this Memorandum as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants of the CD.

(Signed) Vasily S. SIDOROV
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on Disarmament

(Signed) Robert T. GREY, Jr.
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative
of the United States to the
Conference on Disarmament

GE.01-60468

ENG

Memorandum of Understanding on Notifications of Missile Launches

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Guided by the Joint Statement of the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Exchange of Information on Missile Launches and Early Warning of September 2, 1998,

Considering the obligations of the Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches of June 4, 2000, hereinafter referred to as the JDEC Memorandum, and

Taking into account the need to minimize the consequences of a false missile attack warning and to prevent the possibility of a missile launch caused by such false warning,

Have agreed as follows:

1. This Memorandum establishes a Pre- and Post- Missile Launch Notification System, hereinafter referred to as the PLNS.

2. Each Party shall provide pre-launch and post-launch notifications for launches of ballistic missiles that meet the range or altitude criteria set forth in paragraph 4 of this Memorandum and, with rare exceptions, pre-launch and post-launch notifications for launches of space launch vehicles. Each Party, at its discretion and in support of the objectives of this Memorandum, may also provide information in a timely fashion on other launches and objects, including de-orbiting spacecraft, and geophysical experiments and other work in near-earth space that are capable of disrupting the normal operation of equipment of the early warning systems of the Parties.

3. Once the PLNS is in full operation, the Parties shall consider the possibility of, and need for, exchanging information on missiles that intercept objects not located on the earth's surface. If methods are subsequently developed for launching objects into space that are fundamentally different from those which exist at the time this Memorandum enters into force, the Parties will discuss how the PLNS might apply to notifications of such launches.

4. For ballistic missiles, each Party shall provide a notification in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Memorandum when the planned flight range is in excess of 500 kilometers or the planned apex altitude is in excess of 500 kilometers.

5. The terms and their definitions applicable to this Memorandum are provided in Appendix 1 to this Memorandum. Notifications shall be provided in accordance with the provisions of this Memorandum and in the formats set forth in Appendix 2 to this Memorandum. When a date and time are to be specified in a notification, that date and time shall be expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).

6. Each Party shall provide notifications in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Memorandum of all launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles from the territory of that Party, and all other launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles owned, possessed or controlled by that Party or by any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association or other legal or natural person (either government or private, including international organizations), organized or existing under the laws of that Party.

7. If more than one Party would be obligated in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 6 of this Memorandum to provide a notification of a specific launch, notification shall be provided by the Party from whose territory that launch is conducted. If the launch is not conducted from the territory of a Party, the Parties shall hold consultations to determine which Party will provide the notification. Only one pre-launch notification and one post-launch notification shall be provided for each notifiable launch.

8. A pre-launch notification, as specified in Appendix 2 to this Memorandum, shall set forth a launch window in connection with the notification that shall be valid for four days beginning with the date and time of the beginning of the launch window indicated in the notification. Such a pre-launch notification shall be provided no more than 30 days, but no less than 24 hours, prior to the start of the launch window. The launch window may be extended, in increments of four days. Notification of an extension shall be provided no less than one hour prior to the end of the launch window. If the launch window expires prior to a launch, a new pre-launch notification shall be provided. If simultaneous or near simultaneous launches from the same launch location are planned, a Party may provide a single pre-launch notification for all of the launches.

9. A post-launch notification, as specified in Appendix 2 to this Memorandum, shall be provided not later than 48 hours after the launch.

a. For simultaneous or near simultaneous launches from the same launch location, a Party may provide one post-launch notification for all the launches or a separate post-launch notification for each launch. However, if a separate pre-launch notification has

been provided for each launch, a separate post-launch notification shall be provided for each launch.

b. A cancellation notification for a launch for which a pre-launch notification has been provided shall be provided if the launch is cancelled prior to the beginning of the launch window, or did not take place in the launch window, or is postponed for more than four days. A cancellation notification for a multiple launch is not required if at least one ballistic missile of that multiple launch was successfully launched.

10. Each Party shall ensure the accuracy and timeliness of the data provided by it, and report any errors detected.

11. Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, all notifications shall be provided to the PLNS Information Center, operated as part of the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) in Moscow as established by the JDEC Memorandum. The PLNS Information Center shall serve as the repository for these notifications, and shall transmit them to the Parties. Until the JDEC is fully operational, an interim repository for notifications shall be created and jointly operated under agreed procedures at a location to be determined by the Parties.

12. The JDEC Heads shall oversee the implementation and operation of the PLNS. The implementation and operation of the PLNS shall be governed by the relevant provisions of the JDEC Memorandum.

13. The PLNS Information Center and the Parties shall use an agreed Internet-based technology incorporating, to the maximum extent feasible, commercially available equipment and software. PLNS equipment, facilities and procedures shall be established and maintained in accordance with the provisions of Appendix 3 to this Memorandum.

14. A Party shall not transfer any equipment, software or other materials and information received pursuant to this Memorandum to any third state or legal or natural person without the written agreement of the Party that provided such equipment, software or other materials and information. Each Party shall use such equipment, software and other materials and information only for the purposes of this Memorandum and shall take all reasonable measures within its power to ensure their safekeeping and security as set forth in Appendix 4 to this Memorandum.

15. The Parties intend that the PLNS shall commence operations no later than 365 days after this Memorandum enters into force. PLNS operations shall commence upon the agreement of the JDEC Joint Commission. Upon commencement of PLNS operations, an operational test period lasting up to 100 days shall follow. During this period, the Parties shall test data exchange procedures, equipment and software, and shall correct shortcomings that they find. The operational test period shall conclude and full

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

PLNS operations shall commence as soon as practicable upon agreement of the JDEC Joint Commission.

16. The Parties agree that the PLNS and the JDEC design, when implemented, will create the conditions for the preparation and maintenance of a unified database for a multilateral regime for the exchange of notifications in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Memorandum. The Parties shall seek the participation of other countries in providing such notifications. The Parties shall seek, as soon as possible, agreement on how the PLNS will be opened to the voluntary participation of all interested countries, and shall coordinate this activity with other national, bilateral and international efforts to enhance strategic stability and curtail missile proliferation.

17. The Parties shall hold consultations at least once a year, unless otherwise agreed, to consider matters relating to implementation of this Memorandum, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto. Amendments to this Memorandum shall enter into force upon agreement of the Parties.

18. This Memorandum, including its associated appendices, shall not infringe upon the rights and obligations of the Parties under other treaties or agreements.

19. This Memorandum, including its associated appendices, all of which form integral parts thereof, shall enter into force on the date of its signature. This Memorandum shall remain in force for ten years. Upon agreement by the Parties, this Memorandum may be extended for successive five-year periods.

20. A Party may withdraw from this Memorandum upon six months written notice.

DONE at Brussels on December 16, 2000, in two copies, each in the English and the Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
(signed) Madeleine Albright

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
(signed) I Ivanov

Appendix 1

Terms and Their Definitions

For the purposes of this Memorandum:

a. "Space launch vehicle (SLV)" means a rocket used for delivering an object into earth orbit or outer space.

b. "Ballistic missile (BM)" means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path, regardless of whether or not it is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

c. "Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)" means a land-based ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle with a range in excess of 5500 kilometers.

d. "Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)" means a ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle with a range in excess of 600 kilometers launched from a submarine.

e. "Earth's ellipsoid" means a mathematical model of the surface of the earth. The standard for this model will be agreed by the Parties.

f. "Launch window" means the four-day interval of time during which the ballistic missile launch is scheduled to take place and starting with the day and time specified in a notification.

g. "Day" means a 24-hour period measured from the specific event to be notified, when applied to timing of notifications in this Memorandum.

h. "Payload" means everything that separates from the last propulsion stage of a ballistic missile, except for the previous propulsion stages.

i. "Range" means the maximum distance measured along the surface of the earth's ellipsoid from the point of launch of a ballistic missile to the point of impact of the last element of its payload.

j. "Apex altitude" means the distance measured along the normal to the earth's ellipsoid from its surface to the apex of the flight trajectory of a missile.

Appendix 1

k. "Launch azimuth" means the angle formed by the projection of the flight trajectory of a missile onto the surface of the earth's ellipsoid and the North direction, measured clockwise in degrees.

l. "Geophysical experiment" means activities conducted in near-earth space that are capable of causing changes in the environment of radio wave propagation, leading to a disruption or cessation of the operation of the early warning systems of the Parties.

m. "Spacecraft" means a vehicle with special equipment and intended for flights into or in outer space for military, commercial (economic) or research (scientific) purposes.

Appendix 2

Notification and Message Formats

Notifications shall be made using the following data formats:

Data Format 1: Pre-Launch Notification
Data Format 2: Launch Window Extension Notification
Data Format 3: Post-Launch Notification
Data Format 4: Launch Cancellation Notification
Data Format 5: Geophysical Experiment Notification
Data Format 6: Spacecraft De-orbit Notification

Clarifications, corrections and amplifications to notifications shall be made using the following message formats:

Message Format 101: Clarification Request
Message Format 102: Response to a Clarification Request
Message Format 103: Correction to a Notification
Message Format 104: Amplifying Information

Notification Descriptions:

Data Format 1. Pre-Launch Notification: A pre-launch notification shall be made using Data Format 1 and shall include the following data elements:

a. Notification ID: PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/zzz/01.
PLN is a prefix which identifies that the notification is related to the PLNS;
PP is a Country Identification Code;
YYYY indicates the calendar year;
xxx is a number from 001 to 500 that represents the PLNS-generated sequential ID number;
zzz is a number from 001 to 999 that represents the sequential number of the launch, this field is used to identify all notifications associated with a specific launch; and
01 is the notification format number.

b. Generic Missile Type: ICBM, SLBM, SLV or Other. "Other" is the designation for any ballistic missile that is not an ICBM, SLBM or SLV.

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c. Launch Location: name of site, facility, range or broad ocean quadrant from which the missile is to be launched.

d. Launch Window Start Date: date launch window begins. Eight digits (DDMMYYYY) indicate the date.
DD is a number from 01 to 31 that indicates the day of the month;
MM is a number from 01 to 12 that indicates the calendar month; and
YYYY indicates the calendar year.

e. Launch Window Start Time: time launch window begins. Four digits (HHMM) indicate the time.
HH is a number from 00 to 23 that indicates the hour; and
MM is a number from 00 to 59 that indicates the minute.

f. For SLVs and for ballistic missiles for which there is no payload impact area: launch azimuth.

g. For ICBMs and SLBMs and for ballistic missiles for which there is a payload impact area: the geographic coordinates of the planned impact area of the payload. This area shall be specified either by the geographic coordinates of four boundary points, or by the geographic coordinates of the center of a circle with a radius specified in kilometers or nautical miles. The notifying Party shall determine at its discretion the size of the impact area.

h. Indication of a single or multiple launch.

i. End of: Notification ID using the unique identification number - PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/zzz/01.

Data Format 2. Launch Window Extension Notification: Notifications reporting a four-day extension of a launch window shall be made using Data Format 2 and shall include the following data elements:

a. Notification ID: PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/zzz/02-n.
PLN is a prefix which identifies that the notification is related to the PLNS;
PP is a Country Identification Code;
YYYY indicates the calendar year;
xxx is a number from 001 to 500 that represents the PLNS-generated sequential ID number;
zzz is a number from 001 to 999 that represents the sequential number

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of the launch, this field is used to identify all notifications associated with a specific launch; and

02-n is the notification format number, where n is a number between 1 and n that represents the number of the extension. The notification format number for the first extension shall be 02-1. Additional, consecutive, extensions shall be sequentially numbered.

b. Reference: reference to precursor notification (Data Format 1) using its unique identification number PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/zzz/01.

c. Generic Missile Type: ICBM, SLBM, SLV or Other. "Other" is the designation for any ballistic missile that is not an ICBM, SLBM or SLV.

d. Launch Location: name of site, facility, range or broad ocean quadrant from which the missile is to be launched.

e. Revised Launch Window Start Date: date revised launch window begins. Eight digits (DDMMYYYY) indicate the date.

DD is a number from 01 to 31 that indicates the day of the month;
MM is a number from 01 to 12 that indicates the calendar month; and
YYYY indicates the calendar year.

f. Revised Launch Window Start Time: time revised launch window begins. Four digits (HHMM) indicate the time.

HH is a number from 00 to 23 that indicates the hour; and
MM is a number from 00 to 59 that indicates the minute.

g. For SLVs and for ballistic missiles for which there is no payload impact area: launch azimuth.

i. For ICBMs and SLBMs and for ballistic missiles for which there is a payload impact area: the geographic coordinates of the planned impact area of the payload. This area shall be specified either by the geographic coordinates of four boundary points, or by the geographic coordinates of the center of a circle with a radius specified in kilometers or nautical miles. The notifying Party shall determine at its discretion the size of the impact area.

i. Indication of a single or multiple launch.

j. End of: Notification ID using the unique identification number - PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/zzz/02-n.

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Data Format 3. Post-Launch Notification: A post-launch notification confirming that a launch has occurred shall be made using Data Format 3 and shall include the following data elements:

a. Notification ID: PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/zzz/03.

PLN is a prefix which identifies that the notification is related to the PLNS;

PP is a Country Identification Code;

YYYY indicates the calendar year;

xxx is a number from 001 to 500 that represents the PLNS-generated sequential ID number;

zzz is a number from 001 to 999 that represents the sequential number of the launch. this field is used to identify all notifications associated with a specific launch; and

03 is the notification format number.

b. Reference: Reference to the most recent precursor notification (Data Format 1 or Data Format 2) for the launch that has taken place, using the notification's unique identification number.

c. Launch Date: Reported date of launch. Eight digits (DDMMYYYY) indicate the date.

DD is a number from 01 to 31 that indicates the day of the month;

MM is a number from 01 to 12 that indicates the calendar month; and

YYYY indicates the calendar year.

d. Launch Time: Reported time of launch. Four digits (HHMM) indicate the time.

HH is a number from 00 to 23 that indicates the hour; and

MM is a number from 00 to 59 that indicates the minute.

e. Number of missiles launched.

f. End of: Notification ID using the unique identification number - PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/zzz/03.

Data Format 4. Launch Cancellation Notification: A notification canceling a previously notified launch shall be made using Data Format 4 and shall include the following data elements:

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a. Notification ID: PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/zzz/04.

PLN is a prefix which identifies that the notification is related to the PLNS;

PP is a Country Identification Code;

YYYY indicates the calendar year;

xxx is a number from 001 to 500 that represents the specific PLNS-generated sequential ID number;

zzz is a number from 001 to 999 that represents the sequential number of the launch, this field is used to identify all notifications associated with a specific launch; and

04 is the notification format number.

b. Reference: Reference to the most recent precursor notification (Data Format 1 or Data Format 2) for the launch that has been canceled, using the notification's unique identification number.

c. End of: Notification ID using the unique identification number - PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/zzz/04.

Data Format 5. Geophysical Experiment Notification: A notification of the time and location of a geophysical experiment shall be made using Data Format 5 and shall include the following data elements:

a. Notification ID: PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/zzz/05.

PLN is a prefix which identifies that the notification is related to the PLNS;

PP is a Country Identification Code;

YYYY indicates the calendar year;

xxx is a number from 001 to 500 that represents the PLNS-generated sequential ID number;

zzz is a number from 001 to 999 that represents the sequential number of the event, this field is used to identify all notifications associated with a specific event; and

05 is the notification format number.

b. Location where the experiment will be conducted: Geographic coordinates of the projection on the earth's ellipsoid, and the altitude in kilometers above the earth's ellipsoid, for the predicted center of the volume of the disturbance produced by the planned geophysical experiment.

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c. Date when the experiment will be conducted: Eight digits (DDMMYYYY) indicate the date.
DD is a number from 01 to 31 that indicates the day of the month;
MM is a number from 01 to 12 that indicates the calendar month; and
YYYY indicates the calendar year.

d. Time when the experiment will be conducted: Four digits (HHMM) indicate the time when the planned trajectory of the geophysical experiment is to be closest to the predicted center of the volume of the disturbance produced by the geophysical experiment.
HH is the number from 00 to 23 that indicates the hour; and
MM is a number from 00 to 59 that indicates the minute.

e. End of: Notification ID using the unique identification number - PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/zzz/05

Data Format 6. Spacecraft De-orbit Notification: A notification of the de-orbit of a spacecraft shall be made using Data Format 6 and shall include the following data elements:

a. Notification ID: PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/zzz/06.
PLN is a prefix which identifies that the notification is related to the PLNS;
PP is a Country Identification Code;
YYYY indicates the calendar year;
xxx is a number from 001 to 500 that represents the PLNS-generated sequential ID number;
zzz is a number from 001 to 999 that represents the sequential number of the event, this field is used to identify all notifications associated with a specific event; and
06 is the notification format number.

b. Location of event: Geographic coordinates of the point on the earth's ellipsoid directly below the point at which the de-orbiting spacecraft is predicted to reach an altitude of 50 kilometers on its final descent.

c. Date of event: Eight digits (DDMMYYYY) indicate the date.
DD is a number from 01 to 31 that indicates the day of the month;
MM is a number from 01 to 12 that indicates the calendar month; and
YYYY indicates the calendar year.

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d. Time of event: Four digits (HHMM) indicate the time when the de-orbiting spacecraft is predicted to reach an altitude of 50 kilometers on its final descent.

HH is the number from 00 to 23 that indicates the hour; and

MM is a number from 00 to 59 that indicates the minute.

e. End of: Notification ID using the unique identification number - PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/zzz/06.

Message Descriptions:

Message Format 101. Clarification Request: A message requesting clarification of a previously received notification shall be made using Message Format 101 and shall include the following data elements:

a. Message ID: PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/101.

PLN is a prefix which identifies that the message is related to the PLNS;

PP is a Country Identification Code;

YYYY indicates the calendar year;

xxx is a number from 501 to 999 that represents the PLNS-generated sequential ID number; and

101 is the message format number.

b. Reference: Unique identification number of the notification requiring clarification.

c. Notification elements to be clarified: Clarification requested.

d. Etc.

e. End of: Message ID using the unique identification number - PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/101.

Message Format 102. Response to a Clarification Request: A message responding to a request for clarification of a previously received message shall be made using Message Format 102 and shall include the following data elements:

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a. Message ID: PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/102.
PLN is a prefix which identifies that the message is related to PLNS;
PP is a Country Identification Code;
YYYY indicates the calendar year;
xxx is a number from 501 to 999 that represents the PLNS-generated sequential ID number; and
102 is the message format number.

b. Reference: Unique identification number of the message requesting clarification.

c. Clarification: Textual information clarifying the requested notification element.

d. End of: Message ID using the unique identification number - PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/102.

Message Format 103. Correction to a Notification: A message of correction or modification to a previously received notification shall be made using Message Format 103 and shall include the following data elements:

a. Message ID: PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/103.
PLN is a prefix which identifies that the message is related to the PLNS;
PP is a Country Identification Code;
YYYY indicates the calendar year;
xxx is a number from 501 to 999 that represents the PLNS-generated sequential ID number; and
103 is the message format number.

b. Reference: Unique identification number of the notification requiring correction or modification.

c. Notification element to be corrected or modified:
(1) Old value;
(2) New value.

d. Etc.

e. End of: Message ID using the unique identification number - PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/103.

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Message Format 104. Amplifying Information: A message amplifying information provided in a previously received notification or message shall be made using Message Format 104 and shall include the following data elements:

a. Message ID: PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/104.
PLN is a prefix which identifies that the message is related to the PLNS;
PP is a Country Identification Code;
YYYY indicates the calendar year;
xxx is a number from 501 to 999 that represents the PLNS-generated sequential ID number; and
104 is the message format number.

b. Reference: Unique identification number of the notification or message for which amplifying information is being provided.

c. Amplifying Information: Textual information of an amplifying nature.

d. End of: Message ID using the unique identification number - PLN/PP/YYYY/xxx/104.

Note:

Unique Country Codes for notifications and messages will be determined by the JDEC Joint Commission as individual countries seek to participate in the PLNS.

Appendix 3

System Implementation

Each Party shall be separately responsible for maintaining the equipment and software it provides. The Parties shall be jointly responsible for ensuring the operational integrity of the PLNS. Each Party shall be separately responsible for providing and maintaining its own properly trained personnel, suitable facilities, equipment and software, a single designated computer workstation for providing information consisting of notifications and messages to the PLNS Information Center, one or more computer workstations for searching and displaying information, internal procedures for providing information to computer workstations, and an interface compatible with the computer and communications architecture of the PLNS. Standard operating procedures for operators, the designated computer workstation and other computer workstations of the Parties, and the equipment and software for the PLNS shall be agreed by the Parties.

The Parties agree to employ the following reporting system to collect, store, process and display information on launches.

1. System Architecture: The reporting system architecture shall consist of a central server supporting several distributed, Internet-technology enabled computer workstations, all connected via a virtual private network (VPN). The system architecture shall be capable of reliably supporting multiple-users (approximately 200) simultaneously with a high quality of service so that users can post information to, and query information from, a database located on the central server at the PLNS Information Center. This system shall not disrupt or otherwise interfere with existing early warning systems.

2. Information Security: The Parties shall establish authorized user access procedures and a mechanism to prohibit intrusion or posting of fraudulent data, to include:

a. User Authentication;

b. Data Authentication and Integrity; and

c. Message Privacy.

3. System Components: The system shall include a central server that can host a database; electronic mail and web applications; a single designated PLNS computer workstation for each Party that can interact with the database to submit notifications and messages; one or more computer workstations that can search and display launch

information; and also VPN equipment that must provide a secure and reliable exchange of data between each Party's PLNS computer workstations and the central server at the PLNS Information Center.

4. Electronic Mail: Electronic mail shall be used to send and receive messages, as a backup means to send and receive notifications, and for performing other functions when the primary notification system is disabled. Additionally, it will serve as a means to transfer unformatted information and other documents between the Parties and the PLNS Information Center. The e-mail program shall meet the following technical requirements:

a. The e-mail shall use generally recognized Internet protocols and standards for transmitting messages;

b. The addresses for e-mail messages shall be expressed in Latin characters;

c. Text shall be sent as an attachment to an e-mail message and created using agreed software; and

d. The attached text shall be sent in two versions; the first in the Party's national language and the second in either English (Latin characters) or Russian (Cyrillic characters). If the national language English or Russian, there is no requirement to submit the second version.

5. System Operational Procedures: The PLNS shall be available for use at all times. Each Party shall access the PLNS using a computer workstation connected to the central server via the VPN. Specific conditions for system operations include:

a. The central server shall be located in the PLNS Information Center;

b. The system may be operated in three modes: live mode for normal operations; training mode to provide an interactive training capability, and test mode to support the verification of upgraded software;

c. Each Party may have more than one computer workstation in separate locations connected to the central server, however:

(1) Only a single designated PLNS computer workstation may serve as the official data entry point for that Party; and

(2) All other computer workstations shall be restricted to read-only capabilities; and

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d. Each Party shall designate a limited number of operators as PLNS launch data reporters for the designated PLNS computer workstation that is its official data entry point. The maximum number of PLNS launch data reporters shall be agreed in the JDEC Joint Commission. Only PLNS launch data reporters shall have notification posting privileges for that Party. All other users shall be restricted to read-only capabilities. All PLNS users shall have access to the e-mail application.

6. System Administration: JDEC system administrators shall be located at the PLNS Information Center and shall have overall responsibility for:

a. Maintaining the system at full operational capability;

b. Managing user access to the system;

c. Monitoring and enforcing information security measures;

d. Ensuring configuration control for the system;

e. Establishing and maintaining backup procedures;

f. Establishing contingency procedures for emergencies, such as operation at degraded levels;

g. Scheduling and executing systems tests and exercises;

h. Scheduling and monitoring maintenance and repairs conducted by technical support personnel;

i. Posting and updating on-line documentation as required; and

j. Archiving the English and Russian versions of e-mail attachments.

7. System Documentation: The system shall provide the following documentation on-line:

a. Memorandum and associated documents;

b. System Description;

c. System Technical Specifications;

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d. Data Dictionary;

e. User Guide;

f. System certification; and

g. Other documents, as agreed by the Parties.

Appendix 4

Security Management

The Parties shall establish the necessary measures and procedures for protecting information being collected, stored, processed and distributed by the PLNS, as well as for protecting the hardware and software used in the system.

1. Information Security: Information Security for the system shall be based on the following principles:

a. Each Party shall treat all information on the system to be of a confidential and sensitive nature, and such information may only be used for the purposes of this Memorandum. Each Party shall itself determine the necessary measures for the appropriate handling of the information and its required protection in accordance with its own laws and regulations.

b. Each Party shall establish strict authorized user access procedures as well as measures to prohibit intrusion or posting of fraudulent data on the system.

c. The system shall include the following security elements: two-factor user authentication, data authentication and integrity, and message encapsulation and encryption.

d. System administrators designated by the Parties shall periodically review audit logs for the system to identify, evaluate and report any discrepancies in data transactions.

2. Physical Security: The Parties agree to establish and uniformly implement agreed measures and procedures for controlling physical access to the PLNS. In this regard, each Party shall establish physical constraints to preclude unauthorized user access to its PLNS computer workstations and shall continuously maintain a local record of all personnel having direct access to any PLNS equipment.

a. The following measures shall be implemented at the central server:

(1) All system equipment shall be located in a secure facility;

(2) Personnel access controls shall be implemented to prevent unauthorized access to the equipment and software; and

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(3) Only maintenance personnel approved by the Parties shall be permitted to service the equipment; and

b. Each Party shall take the following measures for all its computer workstations connected to the PLNS:

(1) All computer workstations shall be located in a secure facility;

(2) Personnel access controls shall be implemented to prevent unauthorized access to the equipment and software;

(3) A maintenance and service log shall be maintained; and

(4) A proper operating environment (temperature, humidity, etc.) shall be provided.

3. Certification procedures for the PLNS shall be agreed by the Parties.

Joint Statement on Funding Procedures

In connection with the Memorandum of Understanding on Notifications of Missile Launches, the Parties have agreed that:

— fulfillment of any financial obligation of the United States of America or the Russian Federation is subject to the availability of funds for such purpose;

— transfer for the purposes of this Memorandum by the United States of America or the Russian Federation of any technology or equipment pursuant to this Memorandum is subject to the export laws and regulations of the United States of America or the Russian Federation, respectively;

— fulfillment of any financial obligations by the United States of America or the Russian Federation regarding equipping the PLNS Information Center with hardware and software is subject to authorization, when required, by the Congress of the United States of America or the Government of the Russian Federation, respectively.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1641
1 March 2001

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 28 FEBRUARY 2001 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A PRESS RELEASE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE OUTCOME OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEETING OF EXPERTS ON A GLOBAL CONTROL SYSTEM

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, dated 15 February 2001, regarding the outcome of the second international working meeting of experts on a global control system for the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies.

I should be grateful if this press release could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and to non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed): Vasily SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on Disarmament

Press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the outcome of the second international working meeting of experts on a global control system for the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies, held on 15 February 2001

On 15 February 2001, the second international working meeting of experts on the creation of a global control system for the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies was held in Moscow. Representatives of more than 70 countries and of the United Nations took part.

Speaking at the opening of the meeting, Mr. Georgy Mamedov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, stressed that the global control system, which was first mooted as part of a package of new disarmament initiatives put forward by President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation, is envisaged as an important component of strategic stability and broad international cooperation. It must be shaped with the participation of all interested States, in strict compliance with the principle of the equality and equal security of countries, and with due account for the economic and technical benefits of its operation for all participating States.

The idea of a global control system was put forward by Russia in June 1999 as a set of political and diplomatic measures intended to counter the emergence of missile threats in the world and designed to create conditions such that there would be increasingly less motivation to obtain and disseminate military missile technologies. The measures also had as their aim the long-term creation of a comprehensive missile non-proliferation regime.

The concept of the global control system envisages, among other things, such multilateral international arrangements as the establishment of a mechanism for the notification of launches of ballistic missiles and of space carrier rockets, to provide strengthened assurance to States of the safe and non-aggressive use of rockets in times of peace; a mechanism to encourage and provide incentives for States to renounce the possession of rocket systems for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction; a mechanism for providing security guarantees to such States; a mechanism for international consultation to resolve uncertainties and disputes and to tackle the further improvement of the global control system; and a mechanism to ensure transparency in the field of space carrier-rocket programmes.

All these and other ideas, considerations and suggestions were deliberated at the meeting, which was of an informal, working character, with free discussion and a broad exchange of opinion. The participation in the second international working meeting of representatives of virtually all the States members of the missile technology control regime, and also of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea and other influential States, lent particular weight to its deliberations.

The second meeting of experts has demonstrated the growing support by the international community for the idea of a global control system, as a means toward resolving issues of missile non-proliferation by essentially political, diplomatic and economic methods, rather than by military means.

Participants at the meeting called for the active continuation of work on the global control system, including by bringing the issue before the United Nations. It was suggested that work should begin on a gradual examination of the various practical aspects of the creation of the mechanisms envisaged in the global control system, including the preparation of an international agreement on a multilateral regime for rocket-launch notifications. Participants stressed the importance of putting the global security system concept into effect and the need for efforts to strengthen the missile technology control regime. In this context, they also discussed the draft international code of conduct to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles, prepared under the missile technology control regime.

All in all, the second international meeting of experts on a global control system demonstrated the determination of the international community to consolidate its efforts to counter the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies in the world, in an endeavour to identify and implement effective non-military mechanisms for resolving this problem. The participants declared the meeting a success, deeming it both useful and constructive. The experts on the global control system will hold further meetings.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1642
15 March 2001

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

LETTER DATED 14 MARCH 2001 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF FRANCE AND SWITZERLAND TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH TEXTS OF THE CHAIR'S SUMMARY PREPARED FOR DELEGATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE FRANCO-SWISS WORKSHOP ON TRACEABILITY OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: TRACING, MARKING AND RECORD-KEEPING, HELD IN GENEVA ON 12 AND 13 MARCH 2001

Attached are the English and French texts of the Chair's summary prepared for delegations participating in the Franco-Swiss workshop on traceability of small arms and light weapons: tracing, marking and record-keeping, held in Geneva on 12 and 13 March 2001.

We would be grateful if you would issue this summary as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States of the Conference and to non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed): Hubert de La FORTELLE
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative
of France to the
Conference on Disarmament

(Signed): Christian FAESSLER
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative
of Switzerland to the
Conference on Disarmament

Franco-Swiss Workshop
on
Traceability of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Tracing, Marking and Record-Keeping

Geneva, 12-13 March 2001

Chair's Summary

Efforts to combat prevent and reduce illicit trafficking and excessive and destabilising accumulations and transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) are obstructed by the difficulty of identifying and tracing the sources and lines of supply of such weapons. There is now wide international awareness of the need for an international mechanism to enable effective co-operation in tracing sources and flows of SALW of concern. The French-Swiss initiative aims to contribute to the process of developing such an international mechanism, which would form a key element of the international programme of action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects to be established at the UN Conference in July 2001. Such a tracing mechanism for SALW would complement and re-inforce the UN Firearms Protocol.

The aim of this Geneva workshop was to consider in some detail the possible elements of an international instrument to enhance co-operation on tracing SALW of concern, including associated preventive measures on marking and record-keeping. Representatives of more than 90 States participated, along with representatives of the UN and other international organisations, technical experts, and relevant non-governmental organisations. The discussions were facilitated by presentations from technical experts on techniques of tracing, marking and record keeping, a Discussion Paper presented by Switzerland, and presentations by the Chair of the Preparatory Committee for the UN 2001 Conference and by the French and Swiss Co-Chairs of the Workshop.

Aims

The overall aim is to establish an international agreement enabling effective international co-operation in tracing sources and lines of supply of SALW of concern, that is flows that contribute to the excessive and destabilising accumulation and transfer of such weapons, particularly in regions of conflict or tension. The key elements of such an agreement should include:

- An international mechanism whereby States commit themselves to take all necessary measures to ensure that they co-operate with other states (and relevant authorities) to assist them in their efforts to trace sources and lines of

supply of SALW that contribute to illicit arms trafficking or to excessive and destabilising accumulations and flows of these weapons.

- Establishing national commitments to take preventive measures to ensure minimum agreed standards of marking and record-keeping of SALW, to enhance the collective capacity of the international community to identify and trace sources and flows of SALW of concern.
- Establishing and promoting appropriate international bodies and processes to support the implementation and further development of these co-operation and prevention measures, including provisions to promote international technical co-operation.

Co-operation in tracing

There was wide support amongst participants for developing international arrangements and a binding instrument to enable timely and reliable tracing of lines of supply of SALW by relevant authorities. There was wide acknowledgement that such an instrument would usefully complement the UN Firearms Protocol, which focuses on enhancing law-enforcement efforts to combat and prevent illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms which involve an organised criminal group.

The main international norm to be affirmed in this connection is that States should co-operate in tracing sources and lines of supply of SALW of concern. In order to identify diversion points or unauthorised arms transactions and flows, such tracing co-operation will have to involve the tracing of legal movements of the SALW being investigated.

There is already some bilateral co-operation amongst states in such tracing activities, and recent initiatives in this area are contributing to the development of such co-operation. A global instrument is needed to ensure effective tracing co-operation, and to clarify relevant procedures and responsibilitie. It should build-upon and re-inforce existing co-operation arrangements at various levels where possible and appropriate.

The international tracing mechanism should be designed to enable tracing sources and lines of supply of specific SALW of concern by States with a direct and legitimate concern in the matter. Amongst its uses, it should be useful for states aiming tracing sources and lines of supply of arms to criminal or rebel groups operating in their territory. It is not the intention to use the tracing mechanism to enable comprehensive monitoring of the legal sources and flows of SALW.

It is important for any future negotiations on this matter to be used to clarify the circumstances in which a State that is concerned about certain SALW has a right to expect co-operation in its efforts to trace sources and lines of supply of those weapons, and what information should be exchanged. What, for example, should be understood as constituting a 'direct and legitimate' concern in tracing certain

SALW? The question of whether other relevant authorities (such as the UN Secretary-General) may also have the right to such co-operation in certain circumstances also needs to be established.

The need for appropriate confidentiality in the treatment of information provided to assist with tracing efforts needs to be recognised, balanced against the requirements for information exchange in tracing investigations and in co-operation to prevent and combat identified diversion points or unauthorised transactions. Issues relating to procedures to ensure timely and reliable information exchange in tracing inquiries will also need to be addressed.

Marking and Record-Keeping

The need to establish agreed minimum standards on marking and record-keeping was recognised. These minimum standards could, as appropriate, build upon the standards on marking and record-keeping established for firearms in the recently-agreed UN Firearms Protocol (recognising that most SALW are covered by the definition of 'firearms' used in this Protocol).

The basic international principle to be established on marking is that each SALW should be uniquely marked at the point of manufacture in such a way as to enable individual weapons to be traced. The marking needs to contain sufficient information to allow the appropriate national investigation authorities to determine, at a minimum, the country and year of manufacture, the manufacturer and the weapons' individual serial number. The markings should also be such that the country of manufacture can easily be identified by relevant authorities in other states, and that they can conveniently be used by such authorities for record-keeping and tracing purposes.

The marking requirements should take appropriate account of criteria including cost-effectiveness, technical and economic feasibility, and reliability. In this context, there is wide understanding and access to effective techniques for marking barrelled SALW at the point of manufacture, and a number of promising technologies promising higher reliability are being developed.

It is important to recognise present realities relating to complexities and differences in capacity for marking ammunition and explosives, and also some types of types of SALW that are not covered by the definition of 'firearms' in the UN Firearms Protocol . Although it is important in the longer term to establish best practices and agreed minimum standards for marking these types of equipment, it may be more realistic to focus initially on establishing standards for marking for those types of SALW for which widely available marking techniques already exist.

There is a need to consider requirements for ensuring adequate marking of existing stocks of SALW. Many existing SALW in official stocks or civilian possession are inadequately marked. Measures need to be taken to ensure that such inadequately marked stocks of SALW are either destroyed or properly marked, particularly if they are circulation or regular deployment or vulnerable to loss or diversion. The international instrument should take account of the fact this will require states that do not presently have SALW manufacturing and marking facilities of their territory to engage in substantial marking activities. Technical co-operation and assistance will be needed to enable such marking to be carried out.

Agreed minimum standards also need to be established in relation to record-keeping. National systems for record-keeping can vary according to differing national circumstances and regulatory arrangements, provided that they national authorities ensure that the record-keeping systems in their country are adequate to enable individual SALW to be identified and traced in a timely and reliable way.

The time periods over which effective and reliable records need to be maintained need to be commensurate that the lifetimes of many SALW. Participants noted that many SALW have a lifetime of more than 50 years.

Mechanisms and Bodies to promote international co-operation and assistance in implementation and further development.

There was wide recognition that an international instrument to ensure co-operation in tracing SALW, including minimum standards for marking and record-keeping, should be associated with measures to mobilise appropriate technical and financial assistance to countries requiring such assistance for implementation. In this context, the provisions for assistance in regional agreements such as the OAS Convention could usefully be examined.

Participants noted that the greatest need might be for technical assistance, for example in establishing adequate marking facilities and systems for record-keeping and information-exchange. Much of such assistance may be arranged bilaterally, but international bodies or mechanisms could nevertheless play a valuable role

Mechanisms for co-operation and assistance in implementing an SALW tracing agreement should aim not only at enabling implementation of agreed minimum standards but also at promoting identification and use of best practices. Further consideration is needed on the best ways and means of achieving this. In this context, ways if ensuring appropriate roles and contributions of industry and civil

society should be considered, including possible technical or financial contributions from manufacturers and dealers of SALW.

The possible establishment of international technical or consultative bodies was discussed. For example, an international technical commission or technical advisory body could be established, to provide technical advice to assist with both the implementation and further development of agreed minimum standards in marking, record-keeping and tracing co-operation. Such a body could also assist in the process of mobilising appropriate technical assistance and identifying and promoting good practices. Some participants noted that questions relating to the creation of new international bodies should be approached cautiously, and existing bodies or mechanisms should be used where possible.

Participants noted that an international instrument on tracing and marking SALW would need to be able develop and adjust over time, to take account of new technical or other development and adjust to the developing needs of States Parties. The instrument should thus be drafted in such a way as to facilitate decisions by the governing body of States Parties on technical adjustments, elaboration or developments of agreed standards and procedures.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1643
30 April 2001

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 APRIL 2001 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DECLARATION OF THE BULGARIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS RELEASED ON 12 APRIL 2001 BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN'S OFFICE

I have the honor to transmit enclosed herewith the Declaration of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, released on April 12, 2001 by the Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Office.

I would be grateful if this Declaration be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and be distributed to all Member States and Observer States of the CD.

(Signed): Petko Draganov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Bulgaria
to the Conference on Disarmament

GE.01-61448

Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

released on 12 April 2001 by the Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Office.

The Republic of Bulgaria welcomes the joint statement of the foreign ministers of Turkey and Greece made on April 6 in Ankara regarding the intention to concurrently start the procedures to become parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the so-called Ottawa Convention). As one of the first countries to join the Convention, Bulgaria appreciates the decision of the two friendly neighbour states and considers it as a substantial contribution to and integral part of the efforts of the international community to completely eliminate these inhumane and indiscriminate weapons.

The agreement between Greece and Turkey constitutes an important step in promoting the Ottawa Convention norms throughout the region and turning Southeastern Europe into an APM-free zone, which is one of Bulgaria's priorities in its regional security policy.

Bulgaria complied fully and earlier than the established deadline with its obligations under the Convention by removing all mine-fields and destroying all APMs stockpiled on its territory. The Bulgarian regional initiatives are in the spirit of the Ottawa Convention. The steps that Bulgaria undertook jointly with its neighbours, the conclusion of the Agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey on non-use of anti-personnel mines and their removal from or destruction in the areas adjacent to their common border, signed in March 1999, as well as Bulgaria's proposal of October 1998 to the Southeastern European states to assume a political commitment not to use anti-personnel mines and not to deploy them in areas, adjacent to their common borders, contribute to transforming SEE into APM-free zone.

We strongly believe that the enhancement of regional cooperation in this area, as well as the transformation of SEE into an APM-free zone brings significantly about strengthening the confidence, security and good-neighbourly relations in our region. We remain committed to continue working with all our neighbours for the achievement of this goal.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1644
30 May 2001

Original: ENGLISH and
RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 29 MAY 2001 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE RUSSIAN PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE PROGRAMME OF WORK OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

The Russian delegation shares the concerns of other delegations in the Conference on Disarmament regarding the current situation in this unique multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament. We have carefully studied all the proposals relating to the Conference's programme of work which have been submitted since 1998, the last time the programme of work was adopted, and we highly appreciate the constructive ideas which they contain.

The Russian Federation would like to make its own contribution to these joint efforts by introducing a package proposal on the programme of work relating to the two outstanding issues, namely, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). We are proceeding on the assumption that the consensus on the third priority issue - the launching of substantive work in the Conference on FMCT - still exists.

After thorough consideration, we have decided to support the ideas of a large number of delegations in the Conference and to agree on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament. The package also makes provision for the establishment at the same time of an ad hoc committee on PAROS, with a negotiating mandate.

In our view, the Russian proposal is constructive and not detrimental to the positions of any delegation. The wording used in both draft mandates is taken from documents that have been adopted by consensus at various international conferences held in the past.

The Russian delegation has already had an opportunity to discuss this proposal unofficially with many colleagues in the Conference. We are especially grateful to those of them who provided comments and suggestions relating to the draft mandates. We made every effort to take these into consideration in the final version of our proposal.

GE.01-62173 (E) 010601 010601

The Russian delegation hereby requests you, Mr. President, to take the necessary steps to have this letter and the attached proposal on the Conference's programme of work issued as an official document of the Conference and to distribute it to all member States and observers of the Conference on Disarmament. Permit me to express the hope that the Russian proposal will be considered by all delegations in a spirit of good will and will contribute to restarting the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Vasily SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Draft

Nuclear disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of the 2001 session, under item 1 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an Ad Hoc Committee to deal with nuclear disarmament.

The Ad Hoc Committee will take into consideration all relevant views and proposals present and future and also address questions related to its mandate.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 2001 session.

Draft

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of the 2001 session, under item 3 entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on a regime capable of preventing an arms race in outer space. This regime could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

The Ad Hoc Committee will take into consideration all relevant views and proposals present and future and also address questions related to its mandate.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 2001 session.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1645
6 June 2001

ENGLISH
Original: CHINESE and
ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 JUNE 2001 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHINA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A WORKING PAPER ENTITLED "POSSIBLE ELEMENTS OF THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF THE WEAPONIZATION OF OUTER SPACE"

Upon the instruction from the Chinese government, I have the honor to attach herewith the Chinese and English text of a working paper entitled *"Possible Elements of the Future International Legal Instrument on the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space"*.

I would be grateful if this document could be issued and circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Hu Xiaodi
Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs
Head of Delegation of China to
The Conference on Disarmament

Delegation of China

Possible Elements of the Future International Legal Instrument on the Prevention of the weaponization of Outer Space

China is dedicated to promoting the international community to negotiate and conclude an international legal instrument on the prevention of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space. In February 2000, the Chinese delegation submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a working paper (CD/1606, 9 February 2000) entitled *"China's Position on and Suggestions for Ways to Address the Issue of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament"*, which outlined China's tentative ideas on the above mentioned international legal instrument. China has further substantiated and developed these ideas. In our view, the future legal instrument may include, *inter alia*, the following elements:

* * *

I. Possible Name of the Instrument

-Treaty on the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space.

II. Preamble

-Outer space is the common heritage of mankind. It is the common aspiration of mankind to use outer space for peaceful purposes.

-Outer space is playing an ever-increasing role in future development of mankind.

-There is a potential danger of armament development and combatant activities being extended to outer space.

-Prevention of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space becomes a realistic and pressing task facing the international community.

-The United Nations General Assembly has adopted a series of resolutions on peaceful uses of outer space and prevention of an arms race in outer space, which have provided a prerequisite for and a basis of the prevention of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space.

-The existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer

space, including those bilateral ones, and the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space, have played a positive role in the peaceful use of outer space and the regulating of activities in outer space. These agreements and regime should be strictly complied with. However, these agreements and legal regime are unable to effectively prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space.

-For the benefits of mankind, outer space shall always be used for peaceful purposes, and shall never be allowed to become a battlefield.

-Only strict prevention of the weaponization of outer space can eliminate the emerging danger of an arms race in outer space and fully safeguard the security of outer space properties of all countries, which is indispensable for maintaining global strategic balance, world peace and security of all countries.

III. Basic Obligations

- Not to test, deploy or use in outer space any weapons, weapon systems or their components.

- Not to test, deploy or use on land, in sea or atmosphere any weapons, weapon systems or their components that can be used for war-fighting in outer space.

- Not to use any objects launched into orbit to directly participate in combatant activities.

- Not to assist or encourage other countries, regions, international organizations or entities to participate in activities prohibited by this legal instrument.

IV. Definitions

- *Outer space* is the space above the earth' s atmosphere, i.e. space 100km above the sea level of the earth.

- *Weapons* are devices or facilities that strike, destroy or disrupt directly the normal functions of a target by various destructive ways.

- *Weapon systems* are the collective of weapons and their indispensably linked parts that jointly accomplish battle missions.

- *Components of weapon systems* are subsystems that directly and indispensably involved in accomplishing battle missions.

V. National Measures for Implementation

-Each country shall, in accordance with its constitutional process, take any

necessary measures to prohibit or prevent any activities in violation of this legal instrument on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control.

VI. Peaceful Use of Outer Space

-This legal instrument shall not be construed as impeding scientific exploration in outer space by all its States Parties or other military uses not prohibited by this legal instrument.

-Each country shall abide by general principles of international laws in conducting outer space activities, and shall not undermine the sovereignty, security and interests of the other countries.

VII. Confidence Building Measures

- To enhance mutual trust, each State Party shall promulgate its space programme, declare the locations and scopes of its space launch sites, the property and parameters of objects to be launched into outer space, and notify the launching activities.

VIII. Verification Measures

(Needs further consideration and development)

IX. Settlement of Disputes

- If a State Party suspects treaty violation by another State Party, States Parties concerned shall undertake to consult and cooperate to resolve the issue. Each State Party shall have the right to request clarification from the suspected State Party. The suspected State Party is obliged to provide relevant information to clarify the matter.

- If consultation and clarification fail to produce satisfactory results for the States Parties concerned, the suspecting State Party can file charges to the executive organization of this legal instrument. The charges shall include the supporting evidence as well as the request for the organization to review the matter.

- Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in the investigation by the executive organization of this legal instrument in accordance with the request it has received.

X. Executive Organization of this Legal Instrument

In order to achieve the purposes and objectives of this legal instrument, and

ensure compliance with the obligations of this instrument, the States Parties hereby establish an executive organization of this legal instrument, whose duties are, inter alia, as follows:

- To receive charges of non-compliance by States Parties.

- To investigate whether there are non-compliant activities.

- To organize consultations on non-compliance concerns between States Parties concerned.

- To urge States Parties that have violated this legal instrument to take measures to stop non-compliant activities and make up for the consequences arising therefrom.

XI. Amendments

- Any State Party may propose amendments to this legal instrument. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary who shall circulate it to all the State Parties. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the States Parties, the depositary shall convene a conference, to which he shall invite all the States Parties, to consider such an amendment.

- Any amendment to this legal instrument must be approved by a majority of vote of all its States Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all the States Parties upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the States Parties.

XII. Duration and Withdrawal

- This legal instrument shall be of unlimited duration.

- Each State Party to this legal instrument shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this legal instrument if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this legal instrument, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the depositary of this legal instrument six months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

XIII. Signature and Ratification

-This legal instrument shall be open for signature by all States at United Nations headquarters in New York. Any State which does not sign this legal instrument before its entry into force may accede to it at any time.

-This legal instrument shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states. Instrument of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

XIV. Entry into Force

- This legal instrument shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by XX States including the Permanent Member States of the United Nations Security Council.

- For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this legal instrument, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

XV. Authentic Texts

-This legal instrument, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to all signatory and acceding States.

* * *

The Chinese delegation would like to reiterate that the above-mentioned elements are still very tentative. Further revision, amendment, improvement and perfection are needed. We are ready, in an open attitude, to work with other delegations, to conclude at an early date a legal instrument aimed at preventing the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, through hard work and serious negotiations.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1646
14 June 2001

Original: ENGLISH

Decision

(adopted by the Conference on Disarmament at its 877th plenary meeting on 14 June 2001)

The Conference on Disarmament, reaffirming its commitment to work intensively towards the approval of a programme of work, using the Amorim Proposal, as contained in document CD/1624, as a basis for further intensified consultations and taking into consideration all relevant proposals,

Decides to appoint Special Coordinators on the Review of its Agenda, the Expansion of its Membership and its Improved and Effective Functioning. These Special Coordinators, in discharging their duties and functions, will take into account all proposals and views, as well as future initiatives. The Conference requests these Special Coordinators to report to it before the conclusion of the 2001 session.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1647
19 June 2001

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 2001 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE STATEMENT OF THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED UNDER THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation of 1 June 2001 on the conclusion of the inspections conducted under the Treaty between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (INF Treaty).

I should be grateful if this statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(*Signed*) Vasily **Sidorov**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

GE.01-62457 (E) 220601 250601

Statement by the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

On 31 May, the inspections which had been under way for the first 13 years of the implementation of the INF Treaty were concluded. Over the first three years – from July 1988 to May 1991 – the parties eliminated, as verified by inspectors, all systems and facilities covered by the Treaty.

The Soviet Union destroyed 1,846 intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, 825 launchers for these missiles, 1,761 pieces of support equipment and 408 fixed structures for launchers. A total of 74 missile operating bases and 31 support facilities ceased their activities related to intermediate-range and short-range missiles.

In its turn, the United States eliminated 846 intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, 289 launchers for these missiles, 251 training missile stages, 3 training cruise missiles and 29 training launchers. Nine missile operating bases and 14 support facilities were dismantled.

Two entire classes of nuclear missiles, with respective ranges of 500-1,000 km and 1,000-5,500 km, were fully eliminated from the arsenals of the USSR and the United States.

The inspections carried out since the end of the elimination period focused on verifying compliance with the obligations prohibiting the production and flight-testing of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. The activities took the form of inspections at former missile bases and former missile support facilities. In addition, throughout the years while the Treaty has been in force, the parties have carried out continuous monitoring - at the portals of the Votkinsk machine engineering plant in the Republic of Udmurtia and at the portals of the Hercules plant in the town of Magna, Utah.

Right from the start, inspections under the INF Treaty went beyond the bounds of the bilateral relationship between the USSR and the United States. They also covered missiles which came under the Treaty and were located abroad: American missiles in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; and Soviet missiles in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic.

After the demise of the USSR, the inspections were taken over by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine as the successor States of the USSR under the Treaty.

Over the 13 years that the Treaty has been in force, more than 440 inspections have been conducted at facilities in the United States, while more than 770 American inspections have been conducted at facilities of the former USSR, including in the Russian Federation. Many thousands of specialists from the States parties to the Treaty have been involved in carrying out these inspections.

The drafting and the successful implementation of the INF Treaty have proved an unprecedented and valuable experience, which is being widely applied in the preparation and implementation of many other international agreements on the elimination, reduction and limitation of arms and armaments. It is significant that, from the outset, this Treaty was concluded and implemented as an integral component of the so-called "architecture of strategic stability", which rests on the cornerstones of the START and ABM treaties.

Moscow, 1 June 2001

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1648
9 August 2001

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 8 AUGUST 2001 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE OCCASION OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE START TREATY

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation dated 31 July 2001 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty).

I should be grateful if the statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed): Vasily Sidorov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

GE.01-64080 (E) 100801 160801

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE OCCASION OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE START TREATY

Today marks the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty), to which Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine - the States that are legal successors to the Soviet Union - and the United States of America are parties. It was signed in Moscow and came into force on 5 December 1994.

The START Treaty is at present the only international treaty under which real cuts in strategic offensive weapons are being made. Throughout the 10-year period, it has played and continues to play an important role in strengthening strategic stability and international security.

In the course of compliance with the Treaty all the strategic nuclear weapons of the former USSR have been removed to the territory of Russia. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as non-nuclear States, have become parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The START Treaty envisages that by the end of this year, that is, upon the completion of the third and final stage of reductions, Russia and the United States will have reduced the number of their strategic carriers to 1,600 and the warheads on them to 6,000 on each side.

A key factor and condition for the implementation of the START Treaty has been the existence of and compliance by the parties with the 1972 ABM Treaty. The parties to the START Treaty have carried out a large amount of work to liquidate strategic offensive weapons, to monitor compliance therewith, including by large-scale inspection activities and resolving the questions arising within the mechanism envisaged by the Treaty, namely the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Taking into account the experience accumulated during the past decade, Russia comes out for further radical cuts in strategic weapons to 1,500 warheads for the Russian Federation and the United States of America by 2008. The corresponding initiatives and other measures to strengthen strategic stability and its legal-treaty basis were set forth in the Statement of the Russian President of 13 November 2000, and are being further elaborated.

31 July 2001